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V I 
I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is on appeal from a final judgment and a final order of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County (the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod). Sharon M. 
Weinstein, the plaintiff-appellant, appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j). The Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to Rule 42 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "poured" this appeal "over" to this Court. This Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
H. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
L Whether there was insufficient evidence, under Rule 59(a)(6) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, to support the jury's determination (by a six to two vote) that 
defendant-appellee, Sinclair Oil Corporation, dba Little America ("Little America") was not 
negligent. 
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue appears to 
be that this Court will "view the evidence in the light most supportive of the verdict, and 
assume that the jury believed those aspects of the evidence which sustain its findings and 
judgment," and that this Court will "upset a jury verdict only upon a showing that the 
evidence so clearly preponderates in favor of the appellant that reasonable people would not 
differ on the outcome of the case." Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 467 
(Utah 1996); Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Products. Inc.. 319 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 24, P.2d 
(Utah App. 1997); see, also, Dairvland Ins. Co. v. Holder, 641 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah 1982) 
(reviewing court should uphold jury verdict unless jury's finding is so plainly unreasonable as 
to convince the court that no jury acting fairly and reasonably could make such a finding). 
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This issue was preserved in the District Court (if, by its nature, it could be), by 
Ms. Weinstein's filing her Motion for a New Trial (R. at 1458-59), her Memorandum in 
Support of that Motion (R. at 1460-78), and her Reply Memorandum in Support of that 
Motion (R. at 1486-96); the Motion was orally argued on October 21, 1996; the District Court 
by its Order, dated October 28, 1996, denied that Motion (R. at 1529-30). 
2. Whether the District Court committed reversible error in denying 
Ms. Weinstein's Motion for a New Trial based on the "sufficiency-of-the-evidence" prong of 
Rule 59(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue appears to 
be whether the District Court clearly abused its discretion in denying the Motion for a New 
Trial. Amoss v. Bennion. 517 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Utah 1973). 
This issue was preserved in the District Court, by Ms. Weinstein's filing her 
Motion for a New Trial (R. at 1458-59), her Memorandum in Support of that Motion (R. at 
1460-78), and her Reply Memorandum in Support of that Motion (R. at 1486-96); the Motion 
was orally argued on October 21, 1996; the District Court by its Order, dated October 28, 
1996, denied that Motion (R. at 1529-30). 
1. Whether the District Court committed reversible error, in denying 
Ms. Weinstein's Motion for a New Trial based on the "against law" prong of Rule 59(a)(6) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue appears to 
be whether the District Court clearly abused its discretion in denying the Motion for a New 
Trial. Amoss v. Bennion, 517 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Utah 1973). 
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This issue was preserved in the District Court, by Ms. Weinstein's filing her 
Motion for a New Trial (R. at 1458-59), her Memorandum in Support of that Motion (R. at 
1460-78), and her Reply Memorandum in Support of that Motion (R. at 1486-96); the Motion 
was orally argued on October 21, 1996; the District Court by its Order, dated October 28, 
1996, denied that Motion (R. at 1529-30). 
4. Whether the District Court committed reversible error in excluding 
Ms. Weinstein's proffered evidence that a desk clerk told her, approximately eleven days after 
the subject slip and fall incident on the Little America premises, in response to 
Ms. Weinstein's explaining that she had slipped and fallen on the Little America pavement: 
"Oh, that happens here all the time." 
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue appears to 
be either one of abuse of discretion (e.g., State v. Pefia. 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994) (in 
general, a trial court is granted broad discretion in its decision to admit or exclude evidence)); 
or a de novo standard of "correctness" (with respect to the question of whether the statement 
was or was not inadmissible hearsay) (e.g., State v. Ireland. 773 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Auble. 754 P.2d 935, 935 (Utah 1988)). See, also, Hansen v. Heath. 852 P.2d 977, 
978 & n. 4 (Utah 1993). 
This issue was preserved in the District Court by Ms. Weinstein's counsel's 
attempt to ask Ms. Weinstein about that conversation (Tr. at 404-05); and by Ms. Weinstein's 
proffer of what her testimony regarding that conversation would have been (Tr. at 465-66); by 
Ms. Weinstein's filing her Motion for a New Trial (R. at 1458-59), her Memorandum in 
Support of that Motion (R. at 1460-78), and her Reply Memorandum in Support of that 
Motion (R. at 1486-96); the Motion was orally argued on October 21, 1996; the District Court 
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by its Order, dated October 28, 1996, denied that Motion (R. at 1529-30). 
5. Whether the District Court committed reversible error in denying 
Ms. Weinstein's Motion for a New Trial based on an "error in law" under Rule 59(a)(7) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue appears to 
be whether the District Court clearly abused its discretion in denying the Motion for a New 
Trial. Amoss v. Bennion. 517 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Utah 1973). 
This issue was preserved in the District Court, by Ms. Weinstein's filing her 
Motion for a New Trial (R. at 1458-59), her Memorandum in Support of that Motion (R. at 
1460-78), and her Reply Memorandum in Support of that Motion (R. at 1486-96); the Motion 
was orally argued on October 21, 1996; the District Court by its Order, dated October 28, 
1996, denied that Motion (R. at 1529-30). 
HI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. HISTORY OF SIGNIFICANT PROCEEDINGS IN DISTRICT COURT 
LITIGATION 
Ms. Weinstein, a right-handed infusion therapy nurse, suffered a badly broken 
right wrist (ultimately requiring surgery) and permanent problems to that wrist, along with 
substantial medical expenses and other damages when, on May 2, 1991, she slipped and fell 
on wet asphalt pavement in the exterior, driving-parking area of the Salt Lake City Little 
America Hotel complex. 
Ms. Weinstein filed this negligence action, alleging that Little America 
negligently caused and/or allowed its premises to be in an unsafe condition, and that that 
negligence was a proximate cause of Ms. Weinstein's injuries and damages, in October of 
4 
1991. After liability discovery (including the depositions of numerous Little America 
employees) was completed, Little America filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Little America moved for Summary Judgment on the basis that its acknowl-
edged actual notice of one slip and fall accident attributable to wet pavement on a different 
part of the surface (the entire surface had been re-covered with an asphalt sealant the summer 
before) that had occurred a week prior to Ms. Weinstein's incident did not constitute sufficient 
notice of a hazard, and on the basis that Little America had to have actual or constructive 
notice of a hazardous condition in order to be subject to liability. Little America also moved 
to strike the Affidavit of Ms. Weinstein's liability expert, who testified, via that Affidavit, that, 
among other things, reasonable industrial practices required Little America to take affirmative 
action to render the general condition of the pavement non-hazardous. 
At that summary judgment stage, Ms. Weinstein had developed evidence that 
Little America's asphalt re-sealing project of August of September 1990 had been pavement-
area wide, that that work had been done by Little America's own inexperienced (in that field) 
staff people, that the work done was done in essentially the same fashion throughout the entire 
pavement area, and that there were other slips and falls subsequent to the said re-sealing 
project but none prior to that project. Ms. Weinstein also developed testimony from Little 
America witnesses that wet asphalt is hazardous and that it was known to Little America that 
asphalt surfaces can be rendered less hazardous by introducing coarsening agents into the mix. 
Ms. Weinstein also developed the fact, at the summary judgment stage, that the sealant 
manufacturer had suggested, in on-product application instructions, that sand could be added to 
the mix to render the surface less slippery. 
Judge Moffat granted Little America's Motion for Summary Judgment, but this 
Court, in an unpublished order (in Case No. 940296-CA), reversed that ruling and the case 
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proceeded to trial. 
On remand (Judge Moffat having died in the interim), the case was assigned to 
the Honorable Sandra Peuler. In connection with the District Court consolidation program, the 
Honorable Stephen Henriod presided at the trial of the case, held, with a jury, August 13-16, 
1996. 
At trial, Ms. Weinstein put on, among other evidence, the evidence briefly 
discussed hereinabove that she had developed at the summary judgment stage and also the 
proposition (uncontested by Little America) that there were, on the subject pavement, which 
covered a fairly expansive area (essentially the entirety of the driving/walking area around the 
Little America complex in Salt Lake City) numerous "hot spots," consisting of locations in 
the asphalt that were considerably more slippery than immediately adjacent ones. 
In the course of the trial, the District Court refused to allow evidence of a 
conversation that Ms. Weinstein had had, in the aftermath of her incident, with a Little 
America desk clerk, in the course of which conversation, according to the proffer made by 
Ms. Weinstein, the desk clerk informed Ms. Weinstein that "that [people slipping and falling 
on the Little America pavement] happens here all the time." 
Little America freely acknowledged, at trial, that it did nothing, in the face of 
any of the slip and fall incidents (by way of physical amelioration, warning, or otherwise), to 
address the "slippery-when-wet" [characterized by some witnesses as "extremely slippery"] 
condition, either before or after Ms. Weinstein's fall. Little America also acknowledged, at 
trial, that Ms. Weinstein had no negligence and that Little America had no reason to think that 
any of the slip-and-fall victims had done anything careless. 
Six of the eight jurors by their Verdict agreed with the proposition that Little 
America was not negligent in connection with Ms. Weinstein's fall. The District Court entered 
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Judgment (R. at 1434) on that Verdict. Ms. Weinstein filed and pursued a Motion for a New 
Trial, based, among other things, on the Rule 59 (Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) propositions 
(1) that there was insufficient evidence on which to base a finding of Little America's non-
negligence (Rule 59(a)(6)); (2) that the jury's verdict was "against law" (the law being that laid 
out in the jury instructions themselves) (Rule 59(a)(6)); and (3) that the District Court's said 
evidentiary excluding evidence of Ms. Weinstein's conversation with the desk clerk constituted 
a prejudicial "error in law" (Rule 59(a)(7)). 
The District Court denied Ms. Weinstein's Motion for a New Trial, and this 
Appeal ensued. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
.L The evidence of Little America's non-negligence was so slight, balanced 
against the overwhelming evidence (direct and circumstantial) of Little America's negligence 
that the jury's verdict of non-negligence ought not, in the interest of justice, be allowed to 
stand. Little America determined to do the re-sealing job with its own personnel rather than 
hire a professional paving company to do the work. Little America used squeegees in the 
work, in violation of the instruction of the manufacturer of the sealant. Little America ignored 
the suggestion by the manufacturer to add sand to the mix to make slip and fall incidents less 
likely to occur. Little America caused "hot spots" to exist on the surface, apparently as a 
result of overlapping in the unprofessional application work it did. An insurance claims 
adjuster fell on the wet pavement a week before Ms. Weinstein fell, suffered minor injuries, 
and reported the incident to Little America. Little America did nothing to make any part of 
the pavement safer in the aftermath of its knowledge of that incident. Other people slipped 
and fell, through no fault of their own, on other areas of the Little America pavement when 
the pavement had become rain-slickened. These incidents all occurred without warning. None 
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of the people who slipped and fell were at fault. There was no "foreign substance/' i.e., 
automotive grease, oil, trash, etc., that could have been left by any third party, associated with 
any of the falls. Little America acknowledged that if all the incidents of which it was aware 
of people slipping in the aftermath of the 1990 asphalt re-sealing project had occurred in one 
place that would be a dangerous condition, and it was also uncontested that the re-sealing 
project was area-wide. The pavement was described as having spots that were extremely slick. 
Little America, with knowledge that coarser asphalt surfacing was available, did nothing to 
make the condition safer, did not post signs, did not attempt to steam clean or otherwise 
address the slippery-when-wet nature of the surface. There was no visible difference from one 
spot to another on the pavement surface, but the difference in the coefficient of friction, from 
relatively non-slippery spots to hot spots, apparently caused the dangerous condition. 
Ms. Weinstein presented live expert testimony, from a safety engineer, explaining the hot spot 
phenomenon and including the opinion Little America acted unreasonably in the circumstances 
and that the condition of the pavement was hazardous. 
The evidence in support of Little America's position of non-negligence was, 
essentially, that its people were concerned with safety, that they were unaware of a dangerous 
situation, that they looked at the scene of the incident that occurred a week before 
Ms. Weinstein's and saw no obvious danger (they did not hire a safety engineer or other expert 
to try to determine why that victim had fallen), that Little America people walked the 
pavement area on a daily basis and were unaware of any particularly dangerous conditions 
anywhere (although they acknowledged that the asphalt there was slippery and "hazardous" 
when wet). Little America retained an expert who did a report that was admitted in evidence 
that offered the view that the spot where Ms. Weinstein fell was the most slippery of the spots 
that he measured but that he did not think that spot was really slippery. Little America 
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offered no expert testimony that the condition of the Little America premises was not 
hazardous or dangerous. 
A fair marshalling of the evidence, attempted by Ms. Weinstein 
hereinbelow, leads to the conclusion that the evidence of Little America's breach of its duty to 
Ms. Weinstein and of its negligence (consistent with jury instructions given in this case) was 
overwhelming and that the evidence of reasonable care and non-breach of duty and non-
dangerousness of the condition was so slight as to lead to the conclusion that reasonable jurors 
could not reach the verdict that six of the jurors in this case reached and that, accordingly, and 
under settled Utah law, Ms. Weinstein is entitled to a new trial. 
Under either the standard for direct appeal of jury verdicts or the 
standard for abuse of discretion of trial courts' denial of Rule 59(a)(6) insufficiency-of-the-
evidence motions for new trial (see Issues 1 and 2 delineated hereinabove), this Court should 
reverse and remand for new trial. 
2L The District Court abused its discretion in denying Ms. Weinstein's 
Motion for a New Trial based on the "against law" prong of Rule 59(a)(6) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure (the law being that laid out in the jury instructions). This argument is 
conceptually related to the argument discussed in the immediately foregoing paragraphs but is 
analytically different. It deals with the same overwhelming evidence of negligence and 
paucity of evidence to the contrary that forms the heart of the insufficiency of evidence 
argument. It focuses, however, on the conduct of the District Court in denying 
Ms. Weinstein's Motion for a New Trial and on the jury instructions regarding Ms. Weinstein's 
burden of proof and Little America's duties and negligence. The evidence in the trial of this 
case that Little America had breached the duty prescribed by the law set forth in Jury 
Instruction No. 16 (R. at 1405), and the evidence that Little America was negligent, as defined 
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in Jury Instruction No. 17 (R. at 1407), in light of Ms. Weinstein's burden of proof as defined 
in Jury Instruction No. 11 (R. at 1401)1 was so strong, and the evidence to the contrary was so 
slight, that the jury's verdict of non-negligence was "against law" (under Rule 59(a)(6)), and, 
accordingly, the District Court abused its discretion in denying Ms. Weinstein's Motion for a 
New Trial founded on that proposition. 
3± The District Court committed reversible error in excluding 
Ms. Weinstein's proffered evidence of a conversation, discussed hereinabove, that 
Ms. Weinstein had, subsequent to the time of the subject incident, with a desk clerk employed 
by Little America. Ms. Weinstein properly preserved the record, by proffer of the substance 
of the subject conversation. The proffered evidence was relevant under Rule 401 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence and was in no fair sense to be excluded under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence or otherwise. It was a significant statement and would likely have made a 
difference in the outcome of this case. It was not hearsay. The District Court's disallowing 
the evidence, rather than allowing Little America's counsel to cross-examine Ms. Weinstein 
and argue to the jury regarding all that she knew and did not know about the person who 
made the statement and that person's knowledge of the history of people slipping and falling 
on wet pavement at Little America, was improper and constituted reversible error. The Court 
should grant a new trial on this basis alone even if it is not persuaded by Ms. Weinstein's 
insufficiency of the evidence or "against law" arguments. 
4^  Related to the foregoing argument (as the argument in paragraph number 
2 is related to the argument set forth in paragraph number 1) is Ms. Weinstein's argument that 
the District Court abused its discretion in denying Ms. Weinstein's Motion for a New Trial on 
lThese instructions are reproduced in the Addendum hereto. 
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the basis that the District Court's ruling in excluding evidence of the said conversation 
constituted a significant Rule 59(a)(7) "error in law." The District Court abused its discretion 
in failing to recognize, in the context of its New Trial deliberations, that it had significantly 
erred in disallowing the proffered testimony in question, and this Court should reverse the 
denial of that New Trial motion for that abuse of discretion, with instructions, on remand, that 
the District Court must allow the testimony in the new trial. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. THE EVIDENCE OF LITTLE AMERICA'S NON-NEGLIGENCE WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT, MS. WEINSTEIN IS 
ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL ON THAT BASIS, AND THE TRIAL 
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING MS. WEINSTEIN'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON INSUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE. 
This Court, in a very recent and directly relevant opinion, laid down the law 
regarding the standard to be applied in reviewing jury verdicts of non-negligence on grounds 
of insufficiency of evidence. That case, Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Products, Inc.. 319 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 23, P.2d (Utah App. 1997), deserves, in the context of this Appeal, extraordi-
narily close scrutiny. Ms. Weinstein is confident that, once the Court thoroughly acquaints 
itself with the record in this case,2 it will be satisfied that, for whatever reason, six of the eight 
2Ms. Weinstein requested (R. at 1539-41) that a transcript be prepared of the testimony of 
all witnesses with the exception of the testimony of Jaclyn Tropp, a nursing profession 
colleague of Ms. Weinstein. Ms. Tropp's testimony dealt with damages only. Accordingly, 
the transcript prepared is, to the best of Ms. Weinstein's ability, a full record of the trial 
testimony. The Court will also have available for its review, of course, all of the exhibits. 
The trial was conducted in a courtroom in which there was no live court reporter. The 
record was preserved by videotape. The court reporter who prepared the transcript faithfully 
reported, to the best of Ms. Weinstein's undersigned counsel's recollection, all aspects of the 
trial (including verbatim accounts of all the depositions that were, pursuant to stipulation of 
counsel, read to the jury), with one exception, in connection with which exception, 
(continued...) 
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jurors rejected the overwhelming weight of the direct and circumstantial evidence presented to 
them and that application of the standards articulated in Ortiz for the granting of a new trial 
(see "Applicable Standard of Appellate Review" discussion at page 1 hereof) should cause the 
Court to order a new trial This Court may also deem it appropriate to review the jury verdict 
of non-negligence and the District Court's denial of Ms. Weinstein's insufficiency-of-the-
evidence-based Motion for New Trial under the difficult (for an appellant) and seldom 
successfully invoked ("so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable 
and unjust") standard. Sharp v. Williams. 915 P.2d 495, 497 (Utah 1996); Nelson v. Truiillo. 
657 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1982); Rovlance v. Rowe. 737 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah App. 1987). The 
2(...continued) 
Ms. Weinstein's undersigned counsel believes, the court reporter has no blame. That exception 
has to do with the testimony of Dr. Craig Smith, Little America's liability expert who was 
unavailable to testify live at trial. Pursuant to stipulation of counsel, Little America took a 
videotape deposition of Dr. Smith. Dr. Smith is or was a colleague of Dr. Milton Wille, the 
engineer who did the report set forth in Ms. Weinstein's Trial Exhibit P-l l . Ms. Weinstein 
understands that Little America originally planned to use the services of Dr. Wille at trial but 
that he became unavailable and Little America then turned to Dr. Smith. Portions of the 
videotaped deposition of Dr. Smith were played to the jury (Tr. at 460), but the court reporter 
who prepared the transcript determined, according to a phone conversation between her and 
Ms. Weinstein's undersigned counsel of August 1, 1997, not to attempt to report the 
videotaped deposition of Dr. Smith because, through the court videotaping process, its quality 
was so poor. In the midst of the showing of the videotaped deposition of Dr. Smith, Little 
America's counsel, having determined to "put the jury out of its misery" (id.)9 truncated the 
showing of the parts of the videotaped deposition that counsel had agreed could be shown 
through the deposition equivalent of Dr. Smith's "direct" testimony. There is, accordingly, not 
only no record presently in the record of this case of Dr. Smith's testimony on direct 
examination; it may also be impossible for counsel to reconstruct, from the transcript of 
Dr. Smith's deposition (which, in any event, is not presently part of the record) what it is that 
Dr. Smith said on direct examination. Other portions of Dr. Smith's deposition were read to 
the jury and are of record (Tr. at 469-92); but it appears to be impossible for the Court, given 
the foregoing sequence of events, to have all of Dr. Smith's testimony for review. 
Ms. Weinstein's counsel's recollection is that, in any event, Dr. Smith's testimony is not 
particularly significant and that he, like Dr. Wille in his report (Plaintiff's Exhibit 11) did not 
offer an opinion as to the reasonableness or non-reasonableness of Little America's conduct. 
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result should be the same. 
Ms. Weinstein urges the Court to understand that this is not a case where the 
directed verdict/j.n.o.v. standard of review of the evidence is apphcable. As explained by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988), 
[t]he standard to be applied by the trial court in determining whether to grant a 
motion for a j.n.o.v. is stricter than the standard for deciding to grant a new 
trial. A j.n.o.v. can be granted only when the losing party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. 
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has recently explained, in the context of the review of the 
review of a j.n.o.v., 
[t]hus, on appeal we must review the record and determine whether there is any 
basis in the evidence, including reasonable inferences which can be drawn 
therefrom to support the jury's determination .... 
Braithwaite v. West Valley City Corp., 921 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added). See, 
also, Alta Health Strategies, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical Service. P.2d , 306 Utah Adv. Rep. 
18, 20 (Utah App. 1996). 
Unlike a party appealing from the denial of a motion for a j.n.o.v., who must 
meet the no-basis-in-the-evidence standard to prevail, a party, such as Ms. Weinstein, in the 
setting of an attempt to obtain a new trial, must meet the "so slight and unconvincing as to 
make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust" standard recognized in the Sharp, Nelson, 
Roylance, and Ortiz cases cited above. As the following discussion will reveal, Ms. Weinstein 
meets that standard here. 
B. THE EVIDENCE MARSHALLED. 
Ms. Weinstein understands that she is required to marshal the evidence in favor 
of the jury's verdict, if there is any such evidence, and then to show that that evidence, when 
weighed against other evidence presented at trial, is so slight and unconvincing as to lead to 
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the conclusion that she should prevail in her contention that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the verdict. E.g., Von Hake v. Thomas. 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). The 
following discussion represents Ms. Weinstein's best effort to marshal the evidence in support 
of and against the jury's verdict of Little America's non-negligence. 
1. EVIDENCE ARGUABLY IN SUPPORT OF THE VERDICT OF 
LITTLE AMERICA'S NON-NEGLIGENCE.3 
Richard Mills, the head groundsman at Little America who has been working 
there since 1987 (Tr. at 22), testified that he had had prior experience, in connection with his 
job of heading up the 1990 re-sealing project (Tr. at 27), in the nature of helping a father-in-
law or some other relative put some asphalt down on a driveway (id.); he saw the label 
(enlarged as Plaintiffs Exhibit 1) that accompanied the sealant product that was applied in 
August or September of 1990 (Tr. at 28); the reason that he, on behalf of Little America, did 
not contact a professional company to do the job was his concern that the one he contended 
wanted to come in and probably shut down a fourth of the parking lot at a time, and he felt 
that it would be more advantageous and more convenient for Little America customers to have 
the work done in smaller patches (id.); he read the suggestion, appearing on the said label of 
the said sealant, that "on smooth pavement, fine silica sand may be broadcast to a wet coating 
to decrease non-slip characteristics" (Tr. at 29); if there was a steeply sloped area or an area 
that was causing a problem he thinks that addition of sand would probably be a good idea (Tr. 
at 30); most of the areas comprising the area that was resurfaced are pretty flat (Tr. at 31); 
though he doesn't have a lot of experience, he's never seen or heard of anybody steam cleaning 
3With respect to both the evidence arguably in support of the jury's verdict and the 
evidence against that verdict, Ms. Weinstein's marshalling of the evidence tracks the transcript 
of the trial on a witness-by-witness basis and, to the extent that exhibits are applicable, 
discusses the exhibits in the order in which they were received. 
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or otherwise bringing out the slipperiness of new sealant under controlled circumstances (Tr. at 
33); he has experienced running in tennis shoes on a coarser asphalt surface than the surface at 
Little America and "you may stumble, catch the tip of your toe of your shoe and not 
necessarily cause you to fall, but maybe a stumble" (Tr. at 39); he knows that the incident 
involving the casualty insurance adjuster, a woman named Sandra Walraven, that occurred a 
week before Ms. Weinstein's incident was in fact investigated (Tr. at 42). 
Sandra Walraven, the woman that was injured a week before Ms. Weinstein, 
testified, via deposition, that, in connection with a second slip she had on the subject premises, 
she did not actually fall (Tr. at 73); she slipped and fell only once, and slipped only one other 
time without falling in connection with the journey across the premises during which she 
slipped and fell (Tr. at 74). 
Mr. Lee Arrington, the Little America security person who investigated the 
Walraven incident (Tr. at 76) and the person who prepared the Walraven accident report 
(enlarged as Plaintiffs Exhibit 2), testified, by deposition, that he has never seen asphalt be 
slippery when it's wet (Tr. at 85) and has never had an experience where he thought, while 
walking on the asphalt surface at Little America, that it was slippery when wet (id.); he has 
never heard any fellow Little America employee stating to him that it was slippery out there 
when it was wet (id); he recalls no other incidents that he's investigated or heard about since 
he's been working at Little America where a patron of Little America has been hurt (Tr. at 
87). 
Bruce Parker, one of the Boston, Massachusetts lawyers with whom 
Ms. Weinstein was working as an expert witness at the time the subject incident occurred (Tr. 
at 91-92; 101) and who stayed at Little America during the trial that brought him to Salt Lake 
City, testified, by deposition, that he was not injured in connection with any of the slips and 
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near falls that he experienced on wet pavement at the Little America premises in the spring of 
1991 (Tr. at 98); he is unable to say whether he ever slipped in the area immediately south of 
the pool (the area where Ms. Weinstein was injured) (Tr. at 104-05); and he does not recall 
having mentioned any of his experiences with slipping on the wet pavement on the subject 
premises to anybody working for Little America (Tr. at 106). 
Don Harsh, the person who has been the head of maintenance at Little America 
for seventeen or eighteen years (Tr. at 110) and the person who discovered Ms. Weinstein in 
the immediate aftermath of her accident (Tr. at 112), testified that he has never heard any talk 
at Little America about the advisability or lack of advisability of posting signs that inform 
people that the asphalt at Little America gets slippery when wet (Tr. at 124); he has observed 
that, as a general matter, surfaces are more slippery when wet (Tr. at 126); and in the twenty-
seven years he's been working at Little America he has not encountered difficulty walking on 
the asphalt when it's been wet (Tr. at 127). 
Leendert P. Van Hulten, the Little America security person who wrote up the 
Sharon Weinstein incident (enlarged copy of that report is Plaintiffs Exhibit 3), testified that 
he believes that not many people read "slippery-when-wet" and other warning signs (Tr. at 
137); although he has sometimes seen such signs posted in the interior of the Little America 
premises, he has never seen them posted on the outside portions of the premises (id); neither 
the idea of changing the subject asphalt surface by roughing it up or the idea of putting in a 
rough concrete sidewalk to make it less hazardous for people walking on a wet surface has 
ever occurred to him (Tr. at 138); he walks the grounds, including the area where the subject 
incident occurred, on a daily basis (Tr. at 140); the conditions that he encountered on the day 
of Ms. Weinstein's incident were no more slippery than usual when it rains there and if he had 
noticed anything out of the ordinary, he would have reported it (Tr. at 140-41); and he recalls 
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no difficulty in walking when the surfaces at Little America are wet (id). 
Jean Grabb, a woman who slipped and fell on the Little America pavement, in 
the rain, on or about June 29, 1991 (Tr. at 144), and whose drawing of where she fell was 
written up as Plaintiffs Exhibit 8, testified, by deposition, that she was not aware of the 
pavement's slipperiness until she fell (Tr. at 152). 
Mr. Al Grabb, who was with his wife at the time she fell, testified that he did 
not experience any slipperiness while walking next to his wife and that he did not fall (Tr. at 
172). 
Shawn Powis, the Little America person who wrote up the Grabb incident 
report (introduced as Plaintiffs Exhibit 9) and who appears to have been the front office 
manager at the Salt Lake City Little America at the time the Grabb incident occurred (Tr. at 
179-80), testified that prior to the time the Grabb incident occurred he was unaware of other 
incidents that people had reported that they had slipped and fallen and suffered any injuries on 
the exterior pavement surface of Little America, including Ms. Weinstein's incident (Tr. at 
183-84); he doesn't recall there being any discussion, at any Little America management 
meetings, regarding safety concerns regarding slippery when wet asphalt conditions (Tr. at 
186); he has never had any near slip and fall mishaps on the subject pavement (id); or 
anywhere else (Tr. at 186-87); he does not know whether asphalt is typically or always 
slippery when wet (Tr. at 187); he is aware of no slip-and-fall incident that occurred after the 
Grabb incident (id); he can think of no mishaps in which any Little America employees have 
had any slips and falls or near falls (Tr. at 188); he has no reason to think that there was 
anything hazardous about the asphalt surface at Little America when it was wet (id); and 
Mr. Grabb was unable to locate the exact location where his wife had fallen (Tr. at 189). 
John Stoner, the Little America director of safety and security (Tr. at 194), 
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testified that his department concerns itself with the safety of patrons like Ms. Weinstein (Tr. 
at 195); he is a member of the management at Little America (Tr. at 196); because the areas 
where the various slip and fall incidents in the record of this case occurred were spread out 
over a large area, he saw no problem in any of the areas that he looked at (Tr. at 203); he 
personally inspected the areas where Ms. Walraven and Ms. Weinstein fell and, with respect to 
the Walraven incident, he didn't see anything wrong with the asphalt and that it was not 
particularly rough or smooth and it was just "asphalt in general in different condition" (Tr. at 
205); he was unaware of any other incident occurring in the vicinity of the Walraven incident 
(Tr. at 205-06); in his investigation of the Walraven incident, he didn't see anything that Little 
America could fix or change that would make any difference, and there wasn't a problem with 
the surface that he could see (Tr. at 206); "at the time" he felt that the investigation of the 
Walraven incident was as full as the circumstances warranted (Tr. at 207); there was nothing 
about the Walraven incident that suggested to him that there was an area-wide hazard on the 
parking lot at Little America (id.)\ he personally walked the general area where Ms. Weinstein 
fell after she fell and, in connection with that exercise, he found nothing out of the ordinary 
that indicated there was a problem with the asphalt (id.); the downhill slope where 
Ms. Weinstein fell is very gentle (Tr. at 208-09); he is not aware of any prior incident of slip 
and fall in the general area of Ms. Weinstein's incident (Tr. at 210-11); there was nothing 
about Ms. Weinstein's incident that suggested to him that there was an area-wide problem at 
Little America (Tr. at 211); he reported the Weinstein and Walraven incidents to Mr. Al 
Landvatter (Little America's risk management person) (Tr. at 213); he does not recall 
Ms. Walraven reporting a second slip to him (Tr. at 218); when Little America's guests report 
dangerous conditions, he examines the areas to see what remedies can be taken (Tr. at 220); a 
week prior to trial he responded to a report from a lady who tripped on some cement and took 
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corrective measures (Tr. at 221-22) imri, ir_ ;onnection with that incident, he perceived a 
potential hazard and took steps to correct :: Tr. as 222): in this case he would have done that 
if he'd seen somebody slip (id ; if tfasre is i situation that he considers hazardous, he notifies 
another department head and/cr the general manager (Tr. at 223-24); he has attended safety 
training or conferences in connection with his employment (Tr. at 224-25); and the first time 
he heard about the Brace Parker hiscury w>> during the trial (Tr. at 225-26). 
Al Landvatter. the risk manner at Little America (Tr. at 230), testified that he 
is very much concerned with safety including the safety of business guests such as 
Ms. Weinstein (Tr. at 231); he figures, basei on his analysis of the number of people walking 
on the Little America surface. that thte inciients involving Ms. Walraven, Mr. Parker, 
Ms. Weinstein, and Mrs. Grab? consdtutec 'a fluke" (Tr. at 233-34); one of his assumptions 
about why Ms. Grabb fell is that she is eldtrly and because sometimes elderly people get 
careless (Tr. at 240); it is conunon knowledge thas the asphalt at Little America gets slippery 
when it is wet (Tr. at 241); he thinks it's crcimon knowledge that people can fall and get hurt 
without warning on asphalt surfaces Tr. a: 142); as a risk management person, he concerns 
himself with preventative mauttenanoe. including steps to be taken at Little America to make 
it less likely that accidents will take place Tr. at 243); he has often found it to be the case 
that warning signs don't do much gcod (T: at 244); money didn't enter into the question of 
Little America's decision not to put some s-nd inro the asphalt sealant mix (Tr. at 245); if he 
had felt that putting sand in the asphalt secant w a^s necessary he "probably" would have 
caused it to be added (Tr. at 246); he was screaking generally about the concept of accident 
victims' carelessness playing a role hn their iccidesits, and not referring to a specific incident, 
when he testified that the pecrle involved n the slip and fall incidents of which there was 
record testimony were careless (Tr. *c 246—"); the slippery-when-wet condition he testified 
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about, referring to asphalt, is something that he has generally observed (Tr. at 247); he has not 
observed the asphalt at Little America to be excessively slippery when wet (Tr. at 247-48); he 
believes it is common knowledge that asphalt is more slippery when wet than dry (Tr. at 248); 
he was "a little" surprised when he learned that there was a variance, in terms of slipperiness, 
between one area of Little America's asphalt and another (Tr. at 251); he believes there's going 
to be a variance from one part of an asphalt surface to another (id); and he learned that only 
in the course of getting ready for trial (Tr. at 252). 
Charles Turnbow, a registered professional safety engineer (Tr. at 253), the 
liability expert who testified on behalf of Ms. Weinstein, testified that the bulk of the subject 
asphalt surface in general was not slippery and that there are areas where a person can walk 
across the area with good traction even when it's wet and not encounter any slipping hazard 
(Tr. at 281); he can't say that Little America's drawing the slipperiness of the asphalt sealant 
out in controlled circumstances would necessarily have eliminated the slipping hazard in the 
"hot spots" that appeared (Tr. at 283); some of the areas measured by Little America's non-
testifying expert, Dr. Wille, had excellent traction (Tr. at 293); warning signs, although they 
are advisable to tell people about a hazard, are not "terribly effective" (Tr. at 298); he assumes 
that the bulk of the surface of the Little America pavement was not slippery (Tr. at 301); he 
understands that everywhere other than the places indicated by the witnesses (with the 
exception of Bruce Parker) who slipped on the subject surface were areas where those people 
experienced no prior problems (Tr. at 302); the overall spreading of the sealant, with or 
without a squeegee, is probably not really important (Tr. at 305); most of the lifting of the oil 
(the slip-causing substance) would, if a reasonably thin and uniform coat was applied, be lifted 
out within three or four months of the sealant application (Tr. at 307); temperature and 
weather can play important roles in the curing process (Tr. at 308); he does not know, for 
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sure, that the extrusion of the hydrocarbons in the asphalt sealant had any bearing on the 
incidents in question (Tr. at 318-19); it's possible for a reasonable human being to walk on a 
surface with a coefficient of friction of .3, the coefficient of friction of static ice is about .16 
[substantially less than what was measured in this case], the coefficient of friction of packed 
snow is approximately .24, and, if one walks flatfooted and carefully across such a surface, 
one can walk without slipping (Tr. at 322-23); in evaluating cases such as this, the recognition 
by the property owner of a hazard is a factor to be considered (Tr. at 324); the amount of 
traffic flow in a given area is a consideration [although it's the least of the considerations] 
(id); and he has not in general found a coefficient of friction to be the same throughout an 
entire parking lot and it is not reasonable to expect a coefficient of friction to be the same 
throughout a large parking lot [although it should be within a fairly close range] (Tr. at 330). 
Ms. Weinstein herself testified that, prior to the subject incident, she had 
walked, while it was raining, on the day of the subject incident, twice in the general area of 
the fall without incident (Tr. at 383); and she did not have any problem walking on the subject 
surface at any time until she got to the place where she fell and that there was no indication of 
any slipperiness up until that time (Tr. at 437). 
Rick Mills testified that he personally supervised the 1990 asphalt re-sealant 
project because he doesn't like to see sealant sloshed around or run up on the gutter or the 
curbs, he took extra precautions to keep that from happening, he is sure he and his crew 
members rolled it and worked it into the small cracks and crevices and spread it out thinly so 
that it would cure properly, with respect to some of the larger areas, he believes that he and 
his crew spread some of the materials with squeegees and then went back over it with their 
rollers to make sure it was worked in and spread out smoothly, and that he is not aware of any 
problem with the curing on that particular job (Tr. at 443); he went out and walked over the 
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surface before any other traffic to make sure that it cured (Tr. at 443-44); he is sure that they 
did the entire area south of the pool [where Ms. Weinstein's incident occurred] in one section 
at one time (Tr. at 444); he walks the grounds at Little America on a regular basis, at least 
once a day and probably twice a day, to make sure that things are done and that there aren't 
any specific problems (Tr. at 444-45); there wasn't anything about the asphalt in the general 
area where he understood that Ms. Weinstein fell that he found to be significant or unusual 
(Tr. at 445); although there is some variation in the surface of the asphalt in that area, it's no 
smoother as far as he could tell than many other areas in the parking lot (id.); during his time 
as a grounds keeper at Little America, he has never responded to a complaint of slippery-
when-wet conditions on the exterior premises (id); he has never laid a gritty, rough substance 
anywhere in the exterior of Little America [although he is aware that, on some of the 
stairways, there's a gritty substance that's been placed on the edge of a step to help traction] 
(Tr. at 446); if he had identified a problem with the smoothness or slipperiness of the asphalt 
in the area where the incident occurred, there was nothing immediately that he could have 
done to remedy it [although, as soon as the weather warmed up, Little America could have re-
sealed and placed some sand or used a different type of material, possibly, and he was aware 
of those measures that could have been taken] (id); but that he didn't identify a problem 
requiring it (id.); after Ms. Walraven fell, a week before Ms. Weinstein's incident, he wasn't 
aware of a problem with the premises and, to his recollection, neither Mr. Stoner nor 
Mr. Landvatter talked to him about the problem prior to the time of Ms. Weinstein's incident 
(id.); he had one or two other people helping him with the resurfacing project of 1990 and he 
was present during the entire time that it was done (id.); he has no explanation for why 
Ms. Weinstein and the other people fell in the period from April through June of 1991 (Tr. at 
448); and when he went to look for the spot where Ms. Weinstein fell, whenever that was, he 
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didn't find any particularly slick spot (Tr. at 450). 
John Stoner testified that he collects all reports of accidents and that if he had 
identified a problem prior to the time Ms. Weinstein fell, he had the authority to see that some 
action was taken, and he did not need to ask permission of anybody to see that such action 
was taken (Tr. at 451-52); before Ms. Weinstein fell, he had no knowledge that there was 
anything dangerous about the asphalt at Little America or particularly where Ms. Weinstein 
fell (Tr. at 452); if he had, he would have done something about it (id.); after Ms. Weinstein 
fell he investigated that incident (id.); in connection with that investigation, what he found was 
"just asphalt, different density, different smoothness" (id.); his office is located close to the 
scene of the Weinstein incident and, during an ordinary business day, he has occasion to 
traverse the area of her incident, rain or shine, a dozen times a day (Tr. at 453); he was aware 
at the time of Ms. Weinstein's incident that businesswomen and businessmen in business-type 
shoes were walking the asphalt of Little America rain or shine and he could not identify any 
particular hazard associated with men and women in business-type footwear walking on that 
asphalt (id.) Ms. Walraven, with whom he spoke after Ms. Walraven's incident, did not tell 
him that he ought to do anything about the condition that caused her to fall (Tr. at 454); 
although he checked the wrong spot in connection with Ms. Walraven's incident at the time 
she reported it to him [he subsequently checked the right spot — after she gave her deposition 
in this easel, he found nothing there (Tr. at 455); and it's an impossibility to ban everybody 
from walking on the asphalt at Little America when it rains (Tr. at 457). 
Craig Smith (see footnote 2 hereto, at pages 11-12) testified that he's worked on 
one other slip and fall case (Tr. at 472); he's provided expert testimony in maybe fifty other 
cases (Tr. at 473); and he does not find a coefficient of friction between .35 and .40 (the 
values established by Little America's expert Dr. Wille in the test that he did a year or so after 
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the accident) very slippery, in comparison with hardwood floors or gymnasium floors (Tr. at 
481). 
2. EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE PROPOSITION THAT LITTLE 
AMERICA WAS NEGLIGENT. 
Rick Mills, the Little America head groundsman, testified that safety at Little 
America is everybody's responsibility (Tr. at 26); he has never been an employee of an asphalt 
or paving contracting company (id); the only experience he has ever had laying asphalt 
pavement or putting sealant down has been in connection with what he's done at Little 
America and what he has observed, in helping a father-in-law or some other relative put 
asphalt down in a driveway one time (Tr. at 26-27); he headed up the 1990 re-sealing project 
at Little America (Tr. at 27); he believes that Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 is the label that accompanied 
the sealant product that was applied in August or September 1990 (Tr. at 28); he did not try to 
contract out that project to a professional asphalt company (id.); he did not try to reason with 
the one contractor from whom he received a bid in connection with the subject re-sealing 
project on the subject of trying to make the job contemplated by that company less of an 
interference with the Little America business operation (Tr. at 29); he recalls reading the 
statement, appearing on the face of that label, before applying the sealant in August or 
September of 1990, that "on smooth pavement, fme silica sand may be broadcast to a wet 
coating to decrease non-slip characteristics" (id.); he got no information, oral or written, that 
said that that suggestion only applied to steep slopes (Tr. at 30-31); he is aware of certain 
places in Salt Lake City where there is a higher traction in parking lots relative to the subject 
surface at Little America (Tr. at 36); he has no idea why such a smooth surface was put down 
at Little America and he never inquired of anyone why such a surface was put there (id.); he 
does "not necessarily" see any safety hazard in having a coarser surface than what was present 
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at Little America (Tr. at 37); he was not aware, prior to the time that this lawsuit was brought, 
of the occurrence of the subject incident (Tr. at 40); prior to the filing of this lawsuit, he was 
not aware of the Walraven incident (id.) or the Grabb incident (Tr. at 41); and he is not aware 
of any steps taken by Little America, between the time of the Walraven incident and the 
Weinstein incident, to make the surface physically less slippery or to put signs up (Tr. at 42-
43). 
Sandra Walraven, the casualty manager representative for Union Pacific (Tr. at 
49), testified that she recalls her accident, which occurred while she was a guest at Little 
America on April 25, 1991 (Tr. at 50-52); she had flat shoes on, no heels to speak of, perhaps 
a half inch or less than a half inch heel and that the sole was leather and the heel was either 
rubber or a composition rubber heel (Tr. at 54) [Plaintiffs Exhibit 5 is a map of the area 
where Ms. Walraven fell] (Tr. at 55); it was raining pretty hard at the time of the subject 
incident (Tr. at 56-57); she was walking very slowly because the surface was slippery from the 
rain and because she was being very cautious and did not want to fall (Tr. at 59); she recalls 
having seen no kind of oil or grease or any kind of that substance sitting on the surface of the 
asphalt before she fell (id.); nor does she recall seeing any such foreign substance after she fell 
(id.), although she looked for such a thing after she fell (id.); in her casualty work she has 
dealt with a lot of slip and fall cases (id.); she recalls that, even before she fell, the surface 
was hazardous and she'd better take it slowly and she fell even with those thoughts in mind 
(Tr. at 60); she saw no alternative path to get where she was going (id.); she scraped up her 
left knee in the fall that she suffered, she got a hole in her slacks, and she also had problems 
with her right foot and wrist, contusions and bruises (Tr. at 61); on her way back to go to her 
room, she retraced her steps and slipped again but did not fall (Tr. at 62); after she changed 
her clothes, she looked to see if there was anything other than the slickness of the pavement 
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and saw nothing (Tr. at 64); if anything, during that journey she was moving even more 
slowly and she tried to do it flat-footed (Tr. at 64-65); the whole expanse on which she 
walked felt slippery (Tr. at 65); she reported her incident to one or two valets and a security 
guard (id); she spoke with Little America's Mr. Stoner that same day (Tr. at 66); she told the 
first security guard that she was coming over from her room in the southwest corner of the 
complex and slipped in the rain on the slick pavement and fell and injured her foot and tore a 
hole in her slacks (Tr. at 67); she is sure she told him that she couldn't see anything because 
of her investigative background; she didn't trip over anything, she slipped on the wet pavement 
in the rain and the pavement was very slick (Tr. at 68-69); she probably told the security 
guard about her second near-slip-and-fall experience (Tr. at 69); on or about May 14, 1997, 
she submitted a report of personal injury or illness [Plaintiffs Exhibit 6] (Tr. at 70); the 
pavement at Little America, compared to the surfaces of other pavements she's walked on, had 
a very slick finish, not porous at all, and seemed to be extremely slick, almost shiny (Tr. at 
72); she has never, other than this incident, slipped and fallen on wet pavement (id.); and she 
does not recall, other than the subject incident, having had any experience of slipping and 
falling while wearing the shoes she was wearing at the time of her incident (Tr. at 72-73). 
Lee Arlington, the Little America security department employee who 
investigated the Walraven incident, testified that Little America puts up signs in interior areas 
that say "slippery when wet" (Tr. at 82); he has never seen any exterior signs saying slippery 
when wet (id.); he has never heard any discussions of or talked to anybody or heard anybody 
else talking about the posting of such signs (Tr. at 82-83); he can think of no reason why that 
wouldn't be a good idea (Tr. at 83); he recalls never having attended a meeting of security 
people about people slipping and falling outside of Little America (Tr. at 84); he had never 
heard about Ms. Weinstein's incident until about a week before trial (more than five years 
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after it happened) (Tr. at 86); and he recalls seeing no foreign substance (grease or oil or 
anything else), just the wet asphalt that Ms. Walraven slipped on (Tr. at 89). 
Bruce Parker, the Boston lawyer who was in Salt Lake City working on a patent 
infringement case in connection with which Ms. Weinstein was testifying as an expert witness, 
testified that the weather was generally raining while he was in Salt Lake City (April of 1991 
until May 17, 1991) (Tr. at 93-94); the parking lot at Little America (where he was staying) 
was extremely slippery when it was wet (Tr. at 95); on at least one occasion, he slipped going 
to his car and on another occasion; another lawyer slipped and fell (Tr. at 96-97); his slipping 
mishap was prior to the time of Ms. Weinstein's accident (Tr. at 100); he never mentioned his 
mishap to Ms. Weinstein before she fell (id.); the climate in Boston, where he lives, is a 
climate he believes is wetter than Utah's, he has walked on plenty of wet asphalt in his time, 
and the asphalt in Salt Lake City at Little America was surprisingly slippery compared to what 
he has typically walked on in the Boston area (Tr. at 102-03). 
Don Harsh, the head of maintenance at Little America (Tr. at 110), testified that 
everybody at Little America is supposed to be concerned with the safety of guests like 
Ms. Weinstein (Tr. at 111); the area where Ms. Weinstein's incident occurred was just south of 
the pool and north of room 3110 [cf. Plaintiffs Exhibit 7 — the blow-up of the map of the area 
— with Plaintiffs Exhibit 11, Dr. Wille's report stating that the most slippery spot he located 
was just north of Room 3110] (Tr. at 113); it was raining and quite wet when he encountered 
Ms. Weinstein (Tr. at 116); he didn't see anything in the nature of automotive grease or other 
foreign substance in the area where Ms. Weinstein fell (Tr. at 117); asphalt at Little America 
gets slippery when it's wet (Tr. at 118); in the twenty-eight years he's been working at Little 
America, he's never had any kind of training or direction with respect to the question of 
making the surface outside the building as safe as possible for pedestrian traffic, other than 
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considerations dealing with ice and snow (Tr. at 122); he's never had any training whatsoever 
with respect to slippery asphalt and how to make it the asphalt safer when it was wet (Tr. at 
123); he's not aware of any discussions in Little America management circles or among any 
group of workers there about building sidewalks that have a concrete surface for people to use 
rather than walking on asphalt on rainy days (id.)\ he's never heard any talk at Little America 
about the advisability or lack of advisability of posting signs that inform people that the 
asphalt there gets slippery when it's wet (Tr. at 124); and the asphalt at Little America is the 
non-porous type (Tr. at 128). 
Leendert Van Hulten, the security person who wrote up the Sharon Weinstein 
incident [Plaintiffs Exhibit 3], testified that, to one degree or another safety for guests of the 
hotel is everybody's responsibility at Little America (Tr. at 130-31); he saw no foreign 
substance in the area of Ms. Weinstein's incident (Tr. at 136); there is probably no safety 
hazard in posting a sign to give somebody a better chance of avoiding a slip and fall incident 
on the subject premises, he believes that signs do some good in some cases if they are read, 
he has seen signs posted in the Little America interior to let people know that the floor can be 
slippery when wet, and he has never seen such signs posted outside at Little America (Tr. at 
137); the idea of changing the asphalt surface at Little America by roughing it up to make it 
less slippery or putting in a rough concrete sidewalk to make it less hazardous for people 
walking outside when it's wet has never occurred to him (Tr. at 138); he worried about 
walking on the day that Ms. Weinstein fell (Tr. at 140); on that day, he encountered no more 
slippery when wet condition than usual when it rains (Tr. at 140-41); and the shoes he wears 
when he's working have a rubber surface (id). 
Jean Grabb, the person who fell on or about June 29, 1991 (Tr. at 144), testified 
that she was staying at Little America (Tr. at 145); it was just beginning to drizzle a little bit 
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and that there was a little bit of rain (id.); she was wearing flat square dance shoes with a heel 
approximately one-half inch high when she fell (Tr. at 147); her accident occurred when she 
and her husband were walking back to their room [Ms. Grabb made an indication, on what 
became Plaintiffs Exhibit 8, indicating the area that she thinks that she fell] (Tr. at 148-49); 
there was a slight downslope in the direction in which she was walking at the place where she 
fell (Tr. at 150); she had had nothing to drink prior to the occurrence of her incident (id); she 
and her husband were walking side by side when the incident occurred (Tr. at 151); she was 
not aware of any slipperiness in the pavement prior to the time and was walking at a normal 
to moderate pace when she fell (Tr. at 152-54); her feet just went out from under her (Tr. at 
154); she had a terrible bruise on her rear end for two or three weeks after she fell (Tr. at 
155); she was right next to Mr. Grabb when the incident occurred but not touching him (id.); 
neither she nor Mr. Grabb realized that it was slippery before she fell (Tr. at 155-56); her 
husband was wearing the same kind of shoes she was wearing (Tr. at 157); her square dancing 
shoes are more for walking than sliding (Tr. at 158); she had never experienced a problem 
with slipping, while wearing any square dancing shoes, prior to her fall (id.); and she has worn 
square dancing shoes at other times in her life and does not recall slipping at any other time 
(UL). 
Al Grabb testified that the weather was just drizzly, not a heavy rain, just 
enough to make it wet (Tr. at 164); to his recollection, it did not rain much the week they 
were in Salt Lake City (Tr. at 165-66); the incident involving his wife was so fast it was 
unbelievable and that her feet just went out from under her and she fell without warning (Tr. 
at 167-68); he looked at the pavement but wasn't able to see anything specific that she could 
have fallen on (Tr. at 168); he told a person behind the counter in the lobby area that the 
pavement where his wife fell was slippery and he wanted them to be aware of the condition 
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(Tr. at 169); he did not himself experience any slipperiness (Tr. at 172); and he did not see 
any foreign substance on the pavement (Tr. at 174). 
Shawn Powis, the person who wrote up the Grabb incident [Plaintiff's Exhibit 9] 
(Tr. at 183), testified that he was unaware of any discussions geared toward making the 
situation more safe for patrons of Little America with respect to walking on the asphalt 
surface when it was raining or the surface was wet (Tr. at 184-85); he does not recall, as a 
member of Little America management, participating in any meetings regarding general safety 
concerns for patrons of the hotel (Tr. at 185-86); he does not recall there being any discussion 
of any safety concerns regarding slippery-when-wet asphalt in any management meetings he 
attended at Little America (Tr. at 186); he does not recall any discussions about posting signs 
to inform people that the asphalt at Little America gets slippery when wet (id.); he does not 
remember seeing any foreign substances such as automotive oil or grease or anything other 
than the surface of the asphalt itself in connection with the Grabb incident (Tr. at 189-90). 
John Stoner, the Little America head of security and safety (Tr. at 194-95), 
testified that he is and has been, for many years, a member of management at Little America 
(Tr. at 196); he did not know about the Grabb incident until a month or so prior to trial and 
that the explanation for that, although he is supposed to be informed of all accidents, is that 
"Mr. Powis screwed up" (Tr. at 198); he has never heard from any source that there was any 
foreign substance, such as automotive grease or oil or anything like that in the vicinity of the 
fall, in connection with the Sharon Weinstein incident, the Sandra Walraven incident, or the 
Jean Grabb incident, and all of those incidents involved only the asphalt surface and whatever 
was associated with it plus rainwater (Tr. at 199); he took no preventive action whatsoever, in 
terms of safety, to prevent a similar thing from happening in the interim between the Walraven 
incident of April 25, 1991 and Ms. Weinstein's incident of a week later (Tr. at 201); between 
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the Walraven and Weinstein incidents it did not even occur to him that there might be a 
hazard of some kind associated with the asphalt surface (Tr. at 201-02); if. for the sake of 
discussion, there had been three or four incidents that all occurred at exactly the same spot on 
the Little America premises, he would acknowledge that there was a hazardous condition that 
needed to be corrected (Tr, at 202); he was aware that Mr. Mills and his crew were doing, in 
connection with the re-sealing project of August or September of 1990. essentially the same 
thing throughout the entire premises (id); the checking that he did into the Walraven and 
Weinstein incidents was essentially an eyeball checking (Tr. at 203); he has never heard of the 
term "hot spot" with reference to a particularly slippery spot on pavement (id.); he agrees 
("quite possibly") with the proposition that the smoother a surface is the more slippery it's 
going to be when it's wet and that roughened up or coarse asphalt is probably not as slick as 
smooth asphalt when it's wet (Tr. at 204); that he's probably noticed that asphalt surfaces in 
some parking areas is much more coarse, much less smooth than the area of Little America's 
parking lot (id.); he can't think of any negative safety factors involving having an asphalt 
parking area where pedestrians walk being coarse as opposed to smooth and he can think of 
no safety hazards in connection with coarse pavement (Tr. at 204-05); Ms. Walraven told him, 
in connection with her incident, that it was raining hard, that she was walking on the asphalt, 
and that her feet slipped out from under her and she fell (Tr. at 206); he did not speak with 
Ms. Weinstein in the aftermath of her incident (Tr. at 207); his understanding of the reason for 
Ms. Weinstein's fall was that it was raining, the asphalt was apparently slick where she walked 
and she fell (Tr. at 207-08); there is probably a slight slope to the area where Ms. Weinstein 
fell (Tr. at 208); it never occurred to him, after the Walraven incident, to have any kind of an 
expert, a safety engineer, for example, come to check things out (Tr. at 216); Rick Mills did 
not talk to him about whether Little America ought to follow the manufacturer's suggestion to 
31 
add sand to the sealant mix (id); if he had seen someone slip on the Little America premises, 
he would have taken steps to correct the condition (Tr. at 222); after he heard about the 
Walraven incident, he did not talk to Rick Mills regarding the possible safety or lack of safety 
of the sealant (Tr. at 225); none of his safety training, since he's been at Little America, has 
dealt with concepts of coefficients of friction in various surfaces (Tr. at 227); and he did not 
think of doing any coefficient of friction analysis on the areas where the subject incidents 
were taking place (Tr. at 228). 
Al Landvatter, the Little America risk manager (Tr. at 230), testified that he is 
not aware of any foreign substance being involved in Ms. Weinstein's fall (Tr. at 231); he is 
not aware of any foreign substance being involved in any of the other incidents concerning 
which there was testimony at trial (Tr. at 231-32); he has no facts to support the proposition 
that Ms. Grabb was careless in connection with her incident (Tr. at 240); he has no facts to 
support the proposition that Ms. Weinstein, Ms. Walraven, or Mr. Parker was careless in 
connection with any of their accidents (Tr. at 241); in the aftermath of Ms. Walraven's 
incident a week prior to Ms. Weinstein's incident. Little America did absolutely nothing to 
make the asphalt surface safer when it was wet (Tr. at 243-44); there is no danger in putting 
up signs to tell people that the subject surface gets slippery when it's wet (Tr. at 244); it 
would not cost much money to take such a step (Tr. at 245); he never looked into the question 
of how much money it would cost to get some sand and throw it into the sealant mix to make 
it less slippery (id); in connection with his stated perception that the asphalt at Little America 
is no more slippery when wet than other asphalt surfaces, he was referring to the general 
condition of Little America rather than the particular spots where the incidents occurred (Tr. at 
248); until he learned of the fact a month or so prior to trial, he was unaware that there was 
any difference, from spot to spot, with respect to the slipperiness, on the surface that had been 
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resealed in 1990, and that he had given it no thought (Tr. at 250); and he did not hire a safety 
engineer or anyone else to come in and do any testing on the surface prior to the time that this 
lawsuit was filed (Tr. at 251). 
Charles Turnbow, Ms. Weinstein's liability expert, testified that he is a 
registered professional safety engineer (Tr. at 253); testified regarding his education, training, 
background, and experience, including a bachelors degree in chemistry and a minor in physics 
and mathematics, the nature of asphaltic concrete and his experience involving pedestrian slip 
and fall accidents (approximately 100-175 cases a year), and other relevant experience 
[Mr. Turnbow's resume was introduced as Plaintiffs Exhibit 14] (Tr. at 254-65) and regarding 
the work that he has done on this particular case [including reviewing essentially every 
deposition that was taken, his review of weather reports, his walking of the subject premises, 
and his examination of exemplars of the shoes worn by Ms. Weinstein at the time of the 
subject incident (Tr. at 165-67); and testified that the purpose of a sealant coat such as that 
applied by Little America in August or September of 1990 is to provide a new, fresh surface 
(Tr. at 274); the time it takes for a sealant to "cure" depends on how it is applied (Tr. at 275); 
the process may take a year to be completed (Tr. at 276); the application of sealant is 
sometimes done in overlapped fashion and when that is done the curing time can be extended 
(Tr. at 277); the addition of sand or other coarsening agents [not done in this case] causes 
little disparities to be present that stick up above the surface and have a tendency to pierce the 
water film and grip footwear, with a sandpaper effect (Tr. at 278); if the sealant is not 
properly applied, a situation can exist on a rainy day, within six to ten months after an 
accident, where somebody is walking along, not noticing any slipperiness at all and then 
suddenly hits a spot with a longer curing period (known as a "hot spot") (Tr. at 279); the 
result is that, as a person walks along, the person goes from an area of high traction to an area 
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of low traction (id); his best explanation of what happened with respect to Ms. Weinstein's 
accident and the other ones that are of record in this case is that people were walking across 
an otherwise safe surface and then encountered such "hot spots" and this is consistent with the 
lifting of the tail ends of the light oil material from the asphalt (associated with the re-sealing 
project, as well as the smoothness of the asphalt) (Tr. at 281-82); he is of the opinion that if 
Little America had followed the suggestion of the manufacturer to add sand to the mix this hot 
spot condition causing the people to fall would probably not have existed (Tr. at 282); a 
process exists, having to do with a steam cleaner or a combination of high detergents and hot 
water, high-pressure cleaning, in connection with which it is possible to accelerate the lifting 
of these oil-type materials and this process promotes the curing process and is done in 
pedestrian traffic areas where there is likely to be pedestrian traffic under wet conditions (Tr. 
at 282-83); if this process had been utilized by Little America, the potential slipping hazard 
would have been reduced (Tr. at 283); it was foreseeable that there would be pedestrian traffic 
in the area where Ms. Weinstein was walking at the time she fell (Tr. at 284); [by way of 
analogy to what happened to Ms. Weinstein] if a person is walking along a sidewalk and sees 
a patch of ice that is visible, that person consciously or unconsciously adjusts his or her stride 
for that development, but if it's a piece of black ice the adjustment doesn't take place and bad 
things can happen (Tr. at 289-90); the portion of Ms. Weinstein's shoe that struck the subject 
slippery spot in connection with which her fall occurred was likely the heel of her shoe (Tr. at 
291); the surface where Ms. Weinstein fell was likely more slippery when wet at the time her 
incident occurred than when Dr. Wille [Plaintiffs Exhibit 11] did his work in September of 
1992 (Tr. at 294); coefficients of friction below 0.5 [the apparent area of Ms. Weinstein's fall 
was measured by Dr. Wille in September of 1992 at .381 present some risk of slipping and 
slipping is likely to occur whenever the coefficient of friction drops below 0.42 and the lower 
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it is. below that, the more likely it is that slipping is going to occur (Tr. at 294); this 
phenomenon becomes particularly acute when there are two contiguous areas, one excellent, 
one slippery, and the chance of falling victim to it are greater because of that difference in 
traction [the adjacent area measured by Dr. Wille in his testing was .63] (Tr. at 294-95); in his 
opinion. Little America did not act reasonably and did not have reasonably safe premises for 
Sharon Weinstein (Tr. at 297-98); the posting of signs is a means by which the risk of injury 
can be reduced (Tr. at 298); he believes that the people whose incidents were discussed in the 
course of the trial slipped on hot spots, or areas of low traction, on the Little America 
premises (Tr. at 300); the process of working the sealant in. with respect to whether it will 
prevent ponding and puddling, depends on the competence and the skill of the people who did 
the job (Tr. at 305-06); the temperature in the time just preceding Ms. Weinstein's incident, 
coupled with the precipitation that was being experienced, is the kind of thing that one would 
expect would cause petroleum products still under the surface from the 1990 re-sealing 
operation to come to the surface (Tr. at 312-14); one of the explanations for the occurrence of 
the Weinstein incident and the other incidents that were discussed in the trial of this case, 
other than the lifting of the oil from the surface as a result of lack of adequate curing, is that 
the smooth asphalt surface, with no rocks or disparities, is substantially more slipper/ than the 
contiguous areas just by its very surface condition and nature, this is the type of phenomenon 
that will further reduce the amount of traction, and the smooth, wet surface itself may well be 
just slippery enough to cause the fall and the hot spots all by itself, when no sand is placed in 
it or any other steps are taken to coarsen it up (Tr. at 327-28); it is not normal to find as big a 
variation from one spot to another, in terms of slipperiness, as what was found in this case 
(Tr. at 331); and the addition of sand to the sealant mix is appropriate with respect to areas, 
such as where Ms. Weinstein was walking, where people may walk or are perceived to be 
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walking (Tr. at 331-32). 
Ms. Weinstein testified that she is 52 years old and has a masters degree in 
health administration and a minor in health systems management (Tr. at 336-37); she was 
staying at Little America at the time of the subject incident (Tr. at 348); a Little America 
bellman directed her to walk in the direction she was walking when she fell (Tr. at 350); the 
asphalt surface where she was walking at the time the incident occurred was wet (Tr. at 351); 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 10 is an exemplar of the shoes she was wearing that day (Tr. at 352); there 
was nothing apparent to her, before she fell, that suggested that one spot was any more 
slippery than any other, and she had never fallen on wet asphalt before (id); she was not 
running late for the meeting she was on her way to attend and she was walking at a normal 
pace (Tr. at 352-53); just as she got toward the end of the pool area she slipped and her feet 
went out from under her and she fell on her wrist (Tr. at 353); she had walked, in the rain, 
without incident, twice in the vicinity of where she fell (Tr. at 383); the incident occurred just 
north of room 3110 [the area of the "hot spot" subsequently tested by Dr. Wille [see Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 11] (Tr. at 384); and there was no indication of slipperiness until she got to the exact 
spot where she fell (Tr. at 437). 
Rick Mills, the head groundskeeper at Little America, testified that the area 
where Ms. Weinstein fell was no smoother than many other areas in the parking lot (Tr. at 
445); no one notified him of a possible problem with the slipperiness of the Little America 
surface prior to the time Ms. Weinstein fell (Tr. at 447); in connection with the re-sealant 
project of August or September of 1990, he and his crew just laid the sealant out on top of 
whatever was there, with some parts smoother than others (Tr. at 448); he has no explanation 
for why Ms. Weinstein and the other people suddenly fell in essentially similar situations (Tr. 
at 448); he has no explanation as to why he and his fellow Little America employees could 
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not find the slick spot that Dr. Wille walked up to and found (Tr. at 450); and, as far as he 
knows, the spot where Ms. Weinstein fell was no different from the other smooth spots that 
Dr. Wille tested (Tr. at 450-51). 
John Stoner, the Little America head of security, testified that Ms. Walraven 
told him, after her incident and before Ms. Weinstein's, that she had fallen on slick, wet 
pavement (Tr. at 454); he is of the view that wet asphalt is hazardous (Tr. at 455); sand in the 
sealant mix would make the pavement less slipper, especially in smooth spots (Tr. at 456); 
especially if there are smooth spots on already existing pavement it seems to make it even 
more appropriate, "quite possibly," that sand should be added to the sealant (id); it was not 
Ms. Walraven's job to say that there was something hazardous or that something should be 
done about the condition that caused her to fall (id.); that is Mr. Stoner's job and the job of 
Mr. Mills, and everyone else that works at Little America (Tr. at 456); and it was certainly 
possible, although it was never done, for Little America to put a sign up in the aftermath of 
the Walraven incident (Tr. at 458). I 
Craig Smith testified that the problem with applying sealant with squeegees is 
that, on most asphalt surfaces, which are somewhat uneven, the squeegees bridge over the 
valleys and will leave heavy deposits of the sealer in the valleys (Tr. at 472). 
3. THE OVERALL WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
As Ms. Weinstein trusts is clear from the foregoing marshalling (pp. 14-24) of 
the evidence arguably in support of the jury's verdict, much of that evidence is, when 
understood in the context of this case, equivocal, self-contradictory, and of little meaningful 
significance. When this Court weighs that evidence against the avalanche of evidence set 
forth immediately hereinabove (pp. 24-37), and views the entirety of the evidence in the 
context of the jury instructions given by the District Court on Little America's duty of care, 
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the definition of negligence, and the burden of proof (see Addendum hereto), this Court should 
conclude that something went awry in the jury deliberations that caused six of the eight jurors 
to determine that Little America was not negligent and that Ms. Weinstein is entitled to a new 
trial. 
C. THE LAW OF RULE 59(a)(6) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCE-
DURE AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
In Efco Distributing. Inc. v. Perrin, 412 P.2d 615 (1966), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
Notwithstanding the admitted virtues of the jury system, it must be recognized 
that as in all human institutions, juries are subject to error. For a jury verdict to 
be regarded as completely beyond control or correction would permit the jury 
itself in some instances to be an instrument of despotic action rather than of the 
law and order it is purposed to preserve. For this reason it is essential that 
there exist in the court supervisory authority to rectify mistakes. 
If it clearly appears that there has been a miscarriage of justice because the jury 
has refused to accept credible, uncontradicted evidence where there is no 
rational basis for rejecting it, or it is plain to be seen that the jury has acted 
under a misconception of proven facts, or has misapplied or disregarded the 
law, or where it appears that the verdict was the result of passion or prejudice, 
it is both the prerogative and the duty of the court to set aside the verdict and 
grant a new trial. This does not have the effect of depriving a party of a fair 
trial by jury, but in reality is a safeguard to assure it. 
Id at 617 (emphasis added). 
In Efco, the Utah Supreme Court found that there was sufficient evidence to 
support the jury's verdict and thus upheld the trial court's denial of the losing party's motion 
for new trial. The key thing for this Court to keep in mind is not the result of cases such as 
Efco (in which there was plenty of evidence to support the jury's finding). This Court should 
focus on the law, as laid down by the Utah Supreme Court, regarding a trial court's power and 
duty regarding trials in cases where there is not sufficient evidence to support a jury's factual 
finding. This Court may and must, in such cases, fix things so that a deserving party, such as 
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Ms. Weinstein in this case, may have a second trial before a jury that cannot be expected to 
err as did the first. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently, in Sharp v. Williams. 915 P.2d 495 
(Utah 1996), addressed Rule 59(a)(6), the law governing "insufficiency-of-evidence" new trial 
motions. In that "dog confrontation" case, the Supreme Court reversed Third District Judge 
Pat B. Brian's denial of the plaintiffs Rule 59(a)(6)-based motion for a new trial in a situation 
where the jury had determined that the plaintiffs injuries were 50% attributable to her own 
negligence. The Supreme Court there held (id. at 497), citing Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 
730, 732 (Utah 1982), that: 
The evidence in support of the jury's finding of fifty percent contributory 
negligence is so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unrea-
sonable and unjust. 
(Emphasis added.) Ms. Weinstein urges the Court, in its analysis of the evidence presented at 
the trial of this case to keep that emphasized standard in mind. 
Furthermore, as set forth near the outset of this Brief, this Court, in Ortiz v. 
Geneva Rock Products, Inc.. 319 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, _ , P.2d (Utah App. 1997), 
reversed and remanded on a jury verdict of non-negligence on insufficiency of evidence 
grounds. The evidence in this case in support of the jury verdict seems, upon careful 
examination, to be no stronger, when weighed against the evidence in support of Little 
America's negligence, than was the evidence of non-negligence in the Ortiz case, when 
weighed against the contrary evidence there presented. Little America had the re-sealing 
project in question done by its own inexperienced people. It allowed squeegees to be used in 
the face of the manufacturer's recommendation (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) to the contrary. It 
ignored the manufacturer's suggestion to put sand into the mix to make it less slippery. The 
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surface which was being re-sealed was smooth to start with. Numerous Little America 
employees acknowledged that the Little America surface was not only slippery, but hazardous 
when it wet. Incidents of the kind experienced by Ms. Weinstein occurred at various 
locations, without warning, in a way that the victims of those incidents had never experienced 
before. Little America's safety chief, Mr. Stoner, acknowledged that if those incidents had 
occurred in one place, he would agree that the situation needed correction and, given the fact 
that they all happened in essentially identical circumstances on the pavement that had all been 
recently resurfaced, Mr. Stoner's acknowledgment should be deemed tantamount to an 
acknowledgment that Little America was derelict in its duty to Ms. Weinstein. 
The coarsening up of the surface would, by Little America's acknowledgment, 
have made the situation less hazardous. Little America did nothing, in the face of the 
Walraven incident, which it acknowledged did not involve any carelessness on her part, to 
make the situation less hazardous. The posting of signs may have helped. Ms. Weinstein 
produced, through an impeccably well-qualified expert, expert testimony that Little America 
did not act reasonably in the circumstances. Little America offered no expert testimony to 
counter that position. Neither Ms. Weinstein nor any of the other victims did anything wrong. 
Ms. Weinstein suffered a life-altering wrist injury, and other people were hurt on the premises. 
This Court should not countenance, on the facts of this case, Little America's argument that 
the occurrence of a few injury accidents is not a big deal. 
The arguable weight of the evidence of Little America's non-negligence (as the 
Court will hopefully conclude, Ms. Weinstein, through her undersigned counsel, has perhaps 
gone overboard in gleaning all possible indices of Little America's non-negligence) is most 
insignificant when compared to the evidence amassed on the other side of the scale supporting 
the proposition that Little America created a hazardous condition on its premises (see Jury 
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Instruction No. 16 reproduced in the Addendum hereto) and did not exercise reasonable care. 
The Court should, on either a direct analysis of the jury's verdict (the appellate 
procedure context of Ortiz), or on an abuse of discretion analysis of the District Court's denial 
of Ms. Weinstein's Motion for a New Trial (the appellate procedural context of Sharp v. 
Williams), grant Ms. Weinstein a new trial based on the insufficiency of the evidence to 
support the jury's verdict of non-negligence. 
Closely related to her contention that she is entitled to a new trial on Rule 
59(a)(6) "insufficiency-of-the-evidence" basis is Ms. Weinstein's Rule 59(a)(6) contention that 
the verdict was "against law." The "law" that is relevant to this discussion is the law that was 
set forth in the jury instructions. As with the insufficiency-of-the-evidence prong of Rule 
59(a)(6), the manner in which this Court should analyze this contention seems to be identical 
regardless of whether it is directly reviewing the jury's verdict or reviewing the District Court's 
denial of Ms. Weinstein's Motion for a New Trial. 
This Court, in Ortiz (again, a case in which it appears that no motion for a new 
trial was launched), paid heed to the jury instructions on negligence and there noted, in its 
footnote 1 to that opinion, that the defendant there had not challenged the instructions. Here, 
Little America lodged no exceptions to the jury instructions that are relevant to this analysis. 
Accordingly, there will be no valid contention, if any contention at all, by Little America that 
the jury instructions were flawed. The instruction (No. 11) on preponderance of the evidence 
(Ms. Weinstein, of course, bore the burden on the question of Little America's negligence) 
provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
If you find that the scales of evidence are tipped, however slightly or 
greatly, in favor of the party with the burden of proof with respect to a 
particular allegation or proposition, you must find that such allegation or 
proposition has been proved. 
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(Emphasis added.) The Court's review of the record in this case, consistent with 
Ms. Weinstein's marshalling of the evidence (augmented, of course, by whatever else the Court 
determines from its review of the record is significant) should cause the Court to conclude that 
Ms. Weinstein, from any fair perspective, tipped the scales, "however slightly or greatly," and 
thus carried her burden with respect to Little America's negligence. 
The conclusion referenced in the immediately foregoing paragraph is buttressed 
by Instruction No. 16 which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
A business property owner, such as Little America, has the duty to make 
its property reasonably safe for its guests, such as Ms. Weinstein, and 
the duty to refrain from creating and maintaining dangerous conditions 
on its property. 
That duty was clearly, on the evidence of this case, breached. Little America 
clearly did not make the property reasonably safe and it clearly did not refrain from creating 
and maintaining the dangerous condition. 
The rest of Instruction No. 16, which states the law to be that the responsibility 
of a premises owner such as Little America is not absolute but that, if there is a danger 
associated with the premises and if the owner of the premises has actual knowledge of the 
danger, or if the danger is discoverable by the owner in the exercise of reasonable care, it is 
the duty of the owner to correct the dangerous condition or to give reasonable warning, to the 
guest, of the danger, is also of assistance to Ms. Weinstein. The Court should keep in mind 
that, given the history of the re-sealing project and Little America's admitted knowledge of the 
Walraven incident, Little America had actual knowledge of the danger or, if somehow it is 
determined that it did not have such knowledge, that that danger was certainly discoverable by 
Little America in the exercise of reasonable care. It is clear from the record in this case that 
Little America did absolutely nothing to correct the dangerous ("hazardous," in the words of 
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several Little America employees) condition or to give any warning, by the posting of 
slippery-when-wet signs or otherwise, to Ms. Weinstein, of the danger. 
This conclusion is buttressed by Instruction No. 17 defining negligence. That 
Instruction includes the standard language that reasonable care does not require extraordinary 
caution or exceptional skill and states that negligence may be founded on "acting or omitting 
to act." (Emphasis added.) Given all the facts of this case, it appears that the jury 
disregarded this instruction as well as the others that are referenced hereinabove. In this 
respect, as well as with regard to the jury's apparent ignoring of the instructions on preponder-
ance of the evidence and the duty of Little America, it appears that the verdict was "against 
law." 
D. THE DISTRICT COURTS EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE REGARDING THE 
LITTLE AMERICA CLERK'S "THAT HAPPENS HERE ALL THE TIME-
STATEMENT WAS ERRONEOUS AND CONSTITUTES PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR, AND ITS DENIAL OF MS. WEINSTEIN'S "ERROR-IN-LAW"-
BASED NEW TRIAL MOTION CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF DISCRE-
TION. 
Most important to Little America's defense in this case has been its contention 
(likely accorded considerable importance by the jury) that few slip and fall incidents occurred 
on the subject premises in the aftermath of the 1990 sealant-application project. See, e.g., the 
District Court's comment on the evidence (Tr. at 232) and the testimony of Little America's 
risk manager, Al Landvatter (Tr. at 232). Especially in light of the tack taken by Little 
America and in connection with Ms. Weinstein's contention that the surface presented a very 
hazardous condition (not only to her and the other known victims but to business invitees by 
the number), the evidence that Ms. Weinstein sought to bring to the jury's attention regarding 
her discussion with the Little America desk clerk was very significant and the District Court's 
exclusion of it may well, with the jury that decided the first trial, have been outcome-
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determinative. Ms. Weinstein sought to put on evidence of the conversation that she had with 
a female desk clerk of Little America, whose name she did not know, to the effect that when, 
on the occasion of her return visit to Little America to give her expert testimony, she told that 
employee of her fall, that employee told her: "Oh, that [people slipping and falling on the 
Little America pavement] happens here all the time." Ms. Weinstein was prepared, as the 
record of the trial reveals, to bring this fact to the attention of the jury in the course of the 
trial proceedings that are reported at pages 404-05 of the transcript; and Ms. Weinstein 
subsequently preserved the record of what that testimony would have been (Tr. at 465-66). 
There was nothing appropriately objectionable about the evidence that 
Ms. Weinstein sought to bring to the attention of the jury, and the District Court erred and, in 
the circumstances of this case, prejudicially so, in its exclusion of that proffered testimony. 
The statement in question was certainly relevant (i.e., under Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, it had a "tendency to make the existence of [the fact of Little America's negligence] 
[even] more probable than it [was] without the evidence"). Nor was its probative value (under 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence) "substantially outweighed by" - if outweighed at all 
by — any putative prejudicial, confusing, time-wasting, etc. effect it could conceivably have 
had. 
Little America suggested in the District Court proceedings and is expected to 
suggest here that there is no way to know what that employee meant by the statement. The 
employee in question was, according to the proffer (Tr. at 465-66), responding to precisely 
what Ms. Weinstein had said - that she had slipped and fallen on the pavement ~ in response 
to the clerk's question as to how Ms. Weinstein had come to be injured. If the evidence had 
been allowed, Little America's counsel could have vigorously cross-examined Ms. Weinstein 
on the subject matter, and Little America's counsel could have argued to the jury that it was 
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most convenient that Ms. Weinstein could not identify the clerk by name, that she was 
fabricating the conversation, and that the clerk's statement was ambiguous. Those things do 
not, however, equate with the conclusion that the District Court appropriately excluded the 
proffered evidence. 
To the extent that the proffered evidence was offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted, it was not hearsay. It constituted, under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, "a statement by [Little America's] agent or servant concerning a matter within the 
scope of agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship." The desk 
clerk purported to have knowledge of facts underlying that statement, that knowledge came (as 
a matter of reasonable inference) to her attention within the scope of her employment at Little 
America, and it was palpably within the job duties of a Little America desk clerk to share 
with customers, such as Ms. Weinstein, conditions on the premises known to that clerk. 
Nothing in present Utah law requires, as a condition of the statements' admissibility, that that 
clerk had been expressly "authorized" or "directed" to make such statements. See E.L. 
Kimball and R.N. Boyce, Utah Evidence Law, 1996, at 8-26 (the authors' brief commentary on 
this subject is reproduced in the Addendum hereto). Also, for a case in which a directed 
verdict entered in the aftermath of a trial court's exclusion of similar proffered evidence was 
vacated and remanded, see McGill v. Frasure. 790 P.2d 379 (Idaho App. 1990). 
The District Court should, in any event, have allowed the statement as 
impeachment evidence and thus non-hearsay (as not being offered — see Rule 801(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence — to prove the truth of the matter asserted). For, by then, Little 
America personnel had given testimony that suggested that the Parker, Walraven, Weinstein, 
and Grabb incidents were the only slips and falls that had occurred on the premises. E.g., 
District Court's comment (Tr. at 229); Al Landvatter testimony (Tr. at 234) that he considered 
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four incidents to constitute "a fluke"); Shawn Powis testimony (Tr. at 183, 187) that he was 
unaware of any slip-and-fall incidents that occurred either before or after the Grabb incident; 
Lee Arlington testimony (Tr. at 87) that he was unaware of any injury incidents on the 
parking lot other than the Walraven incident. 
Ms. Weinstein respectfully suggests that this Court should keep in mind, as it 
considers this evidentiary issue, the bedrock principle that appears in Rule 102 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence: 
These Rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination 
of unjustifiable defense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of 
the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings 
justly determined. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The District Court should have allowed the subject evidence to be presented 
and, in the circumstances of this case, its exclusion of the proffered evidence was reversible 
error. 
Related to the immediately foregoing analysis regarding the District Court's 
erroneous and prejudicial exclusion of the evidence of Ms. Weinstein's conversation with the 
desk clerk is the proposition that the District Court abused its discretion in denying 
Ms. Weinstein's Motion for a New Trial founded on the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
59(a)(7) "error in the law" basis, having to do with its exclusion of the subject testimony. 
Especially given the dynamics of this case and Little America's own said evidentiary 
suggestion, through witnesses Landvatter, Powis, and Arlington, that the slip and fall incidents 
specifically discussed at trial were the only ones that had occurred at Little America in the 
aftermath of the subject re-sealing project of 1990, the District Court abused its discretion, in 
the totality of the circumstances, in excluding the proffered testimony that slip and fall 
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incidents on the Little America paved exterior surfaces "happen all the time." 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Ms. Weinstein does not suggest that this Court should determine, as a matter of 
law, that Little America was negligent The result she seeks is the convening of a new trial in 
which a new jury cannot reasonably be expected to err as did the jury in the trial held in 
August of 1996. The Utah Supreme Court cogently stated, nearly 50 years ago: 
As was observed by Lord Mansfield in Bright v. Evnon. 1 Burrows 390, the 
effect of a new trial is 'no more than having the cause more deliberately 
considered by another jury, when there is reasonable doubt, or perhaps a 
certainty, that justice has not been done/ 
King v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 212 P.2d 692, 699 (Utah 1949). 
In reiteration of what has been stated hereinabove, there was "insufficient 
evidence to justify the verdict/' and the verdict of Little America's non-negligence was, in 
light of the evidence and the pertinent instructions given them and the reasonable inferences to 
be drawn therefrom, clearly "against law." The District Court's denial of Ms. Weinstein's Rule 
59(a)(6)-based Motion for a New Trial constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
Furthermore, the District Court committed reversible error in excluding 
Ms. Weinstein's proposed evidence regarding her conversation with the Little America desk 
clerk, and the District Court's denial of Ms. Weinstein's rule 59(a)(7)-based Motion for a New 
Trial was an abuse of discretion. 
This Court should, if it agrees with Ms. Weinstein regarding the exclusion of 
that evidence, instruct the District Court to allow that erroneously excluded evidence to be 
presented to the jury in the new trial. 
Ms. Weinstein urges this Court, in the interest of justice, to reverse and remand 
for a new trial. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. H 
Whenever in these instructions it is stated that the 
burden, or the burden of proof, rests upon either party to 
prove a certain allegation or proposition, the meaning of such 
an instruction is this: that unless the truth of that allega-
tion or proposition is proved by a "preponderance of the evi-
dence," you must find that the same is not true. This is not 
as strict a standard of proof as that of "proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt" that is required for the government to obtain 
a criminal conviction. It simply means that, if the evidence 
is evenly balanced as to its convincing force, or less, on any 
allegation or proposition, you must find that such allegation 
or proposition has not been proved. If, on the other hand, you 
find that the scales of evidence are tipped, however slightly 
or greatly, in favor of the party with the burden of oroof with 
respect to a particular allegation or proposition, you must 
find that such allegation or proposition has been proved. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. J G/ 
A business property owner, such as Little America, has the 
duty to make its property reasonably safe for its guests, such as 
Ms. Weinstein, and the duty to refrain from creating and 
maintaining dangerous conditions on its property. 
The responsibility of a premises owner, such as Little 
America, is not absolute; it is not that of an insurer. If, 
however, there is danger associated with the premises and if the 
owner of the premises has actual knowledge of the danger, or if the 
danger is discoverable by the owner in the exercise of reasonable 
care, it is the duty of the owner to correct the dangerous 
condition or to give reasonable warning, to the guest, of the 
danger. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. iQ 
A person has a duty to use reasonable care to avoid 
injuring other people. "Negligence" simply means the failure to 
use reasonable care. Reasonable care does not require 
extraordinary caution or exceptional skill. Reasonable care is 
what an ordinary, prudent person uses in similar situations. 
The amount of care that is considered "reasonable" 
depends on the situation. You must decide what a prudent person 
with similar knowledge would do in a similar situation. 
Negligence may arise in acting or in failing to act. 
A party who injuries or damages are caused by another 
party's negligent conduct may recover compensation from the 
negligent party for those injuries or damages 
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UTAH EVIDENCE LAW 
common law and in the 1971 Utah Rules of Evidence. They are now characterized as nonhearsay. 
Admission by employees concerning their worky Rule 801(d)(2)(D). At common law most 
jurisdictions refused to admit an employee's statement as an admission against an employer in the 
absence of a showing that the employer had affirmatively authorized the employee to speak on the 
employer's behalf.138 The 1971 Rules changed the traditional restriction by allowing into evidence, 
as an admission, a statement of an employee or agent made while still so employed and concerning 
a matter within the scope of such employment or agency. The 1983 Rules apply essentially this same 
standard.139 , 
Under this rule, federal courts have admitted such declarations as an employee's evaluation of 
the employer's safety procedures140 and statements by employees regarding the standards their 
employer considered important in hiring.141 The question in each case is whether the employee was 
speaking about a matter within the scope of their current employment.142 
Courts have generally held that a statement of a public officer, prosecuting attorney, or police 
officer is not an admission against the government in a criminal case.143 However, there are some 
138
 See, e.g., Preston v. Lamb, 436 P.2d 1021, 1022 (Utah 1968) (error to admit statement by waitress concerning 
condition of floor when not authorized to make statement). See generally Boyce, Rule 63(9)(a) of Uniform Rules 
of Evidence—A Vector Analysis, 5 UTAH L. REV. 311 passim (1957) (discussing effects of adoption in 1971 of 
Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(9)(a) on existing Utah law of admissions). i 
139
 Utah R. Evid. 63(9) (1971) called such statements "vicarious admissions" and made them an exception to the 
hearsay rule. It also required that the employee be unavailable, something not required under the 1983 Rules. 
140
 In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, 871 F.2d 812, 816 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). I I 
141
 O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., 748 F.2d 1543, 1547-49 (11th Cir. 1984). 
142
 For example, in United States v. Young, 736 F.2d 565, 567-68 (10th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), rev'd on different 
issue, 470 U.S. 1 (1985), the defendant was vice president of a corporation. The government offered against him, 
as an admission, statements made by an accountant for the corporation who worked under the defendant's direction. 
The Tenth Circuit found no error in admitting the statements. This carries the agency idea very far. 
143
 For example, in State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 846-49 (Utah 1988), the court held 3-2 that a letter written by 
the prosecutor that could be interpreted as admitting the weakness of the state's case was not admissible because it 
did not relate to the facts but was only an opinion about the strength of the evidence, an opinion not helpful to the 
jury. The work product privilege was not applicable because the letter was not private; yet the principle is appealing 
that attorneys should have an area in which to investigate, assess, and discuss without their evaluative statements 
being used against a client. 
The balance might have tipped in favor of admission if the letter had been more "factual." The decision provides 
no indication about how much significance was attached to the fact that the declarant was a prosecutor. The 
majority's language is general and broad enough to include all attorneys. I 
The language of the Utah evidence Rule ("concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment") 
is broad enough to encompass police or attorney statements, but policy may require a narrower reading as there are 
a great many government agents, many of whom are far removed from major responsibility. There are also 
considerations imposed by Rule 403 such as limited probative value and a significant possibility the jury will 
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